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Abstract
The World One Health Congresses are biennial gatherings of approximately 1500 professionals from relevant
international organisations, OIE, FAO, WHO, World Bank, leading scientific experts and researchers in the field of
One Health, animal production and trade, food safety, animal health, human health and environmentology/ecology,
government representatives in public health, human health, food safety, environmental health and global health
security. The Congress is organized by the One Health Platform.
This white paper summarizes highlights of the 5th International One Health Congress in Saskatoon, Canada, June
2018 and serves as a roadmap for the future, detailing several concrete action points to be carried out in the run-
up to the 6th World One Health Congress in Edinburgh, Scotland, June 2020.
Executive summary
The World One Health Congresses are biennial gather-
ings of approximately 1500 professionals from relevant
international organisations, OIE, FAO, WHO, World
Bank, leading scientific experts and researchers in the
field of One Health, animal production and trade, food
safety, animal health, human health and environmentol-
ogy/ecology, government representatives in public
health, human health, food safety, environmental health
and global health security. The Congress is organized by
the One Health Platform.
The meeting of scientists occurs in the One
Health Science (OHS) and Antimicrobial Resist-
ance (AMR) programme tracks. The programme is
based on the Scientific Agendas of OHS and AMR.
The aim is to exchange high-level scientific data and
to foster collaborations. The exchange between sci-
entists and government officials responsible for pub-
lic health, animal health, food safety and global
health security occurs in the Science Policy Inter-
face (SPI) programme track.
This document summarizes some highlights of the 5th
International One Health Congress in Saskatoon,
Canada, June 2018 and serves as a roadmap for the fu-
ture, detailing several concrete action points to be car-
ried out in the run-up to the 6th World One Health
Congress in Edinburgh, Scotland, June 2020.
In summary, the most important actions coming out
of the 5th International One Health Congress are:
– The need for the organization of an International
One Health Forum in collaboration with Africa
CDC with a focus on 3 questions: 1) What are
the top zoonotic diseases of importance across
the African continent? 2) How should National
Public Health Institutes (NPHI’s) conduct
surveillance for a selection of these priority
zoonotic diseases? 3) How do NPHI’s assess the
risk of zoonotic cases and clusters in
collaboration with animal and environmental
sectors?
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– The need for the establishment of a Bio Threats
Scanning Group that comprises top level experts
from leading laboratories in pathogen discovery.
Their main tasks will be
◦ to provide an overarching perspective to One
Health and Global Health Security and as such
connect both worlds.
◦ to help predict potential biological events that
could impact public health security in the future
and to detect gaps in research in the fields of
zoonoses, emerging infectious diseases and AMR,
including the ecological and environmental factors
which impact on these diseases.
– Establishing a focused scientific agenda on OHS and
on AMR as a framework of the 6th World One
Health Congress, June 2020, Edinburgh and engage
the broader scientific community and the public
health and global health security communities.
– The need for increased connections between One
Health Science and Global Health Security and thus
more attention for One Health Science with an
impact on Global Health Security in governments
and international institutions and subsequently
increased inter-sectoral collaboration.
– Further discussion and work on “peace time”
preparedness elements: syndrome surveillance in
humans and animals, pathogen discovery
(identification platforms for humans and animals),
diagnostic development and distribution platforms,
mathematical modelling, animal models,
pathogenesis study platforms for new infections,
preventive intervention platforms, therapeutic
discovery platforms and communication strategies.
– The need for the establishment of a network of
spokespersons on science-related vaccine issues that
unites vaccination advocates worldwide
Introduction: make science evolve to improve
health and security
There is a significant increase in the emergence of infec-
tious agents and the risk of new pandemics as exempli-
fied by the spread of highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza
since 2003, the pandemic H1N1 influenza in 2009, influ-
enza H7N9 in 2013, SARS, MERS, chikungunya, dengue,
Zika and Ebola. It is relevant to note that SARS, as the
first novel pandemic threat of the new millennium, has
clearly demonstrated that previously unknown patho-
gens can emerge from a wildlife source at any time in
any place and without warning, threaten the health,
well-being and economies of all societies. There was a
clear need for countries to have the capability and cap-
acity to maintain an effective alert and response system
to detect and quickly react to outbreaks of international
concern, and to share information about such outbreaks
rapidly and transparently. Responding to pandemic
threats requires global cooperation and global participa-
tion. Combined with the growing globalization of health
risks and the importance of the human-animal-
ecosystem interface in the evolution and emergence of
pathogens, the best solution appears to be a One
Health approach.
It is very clear that zoonoses are an International
Public Health issue: in the past two decades, 60% of
emerging infectious human diseases had their source in
animals. Since 1970, new infectious diseases of humans
have been discovered at an average rate of 1 every 8
months. Influenza pandemics are an economic issue: the
World Bank has suggested that a low level pandemic
could globally reduce production by almost 1% of gross
domestic product, a moderate pandemic by almost 2%
and a serious pandemic by as much as 5%, which would
result in a serious economic recession. Zoonotic diseases
that start to spread among humans are also a societal
issue: SARS in 2003 and H1N1 influenza in 2009 have
shown how quickly panic, stigmatization and mistrust
towards governments and the scientific community can
arise (even during clearly moderate epidemics). Effects
may be long-lasting and have long-term consequences
for populations’ support of health measures. This em-
phasizes the important role of communication in health
issues. Zoonotic diseases have security implications: 80%
of known biological weapons have a zoonotic origin.
Antimicrobial resistance develops and spreads at the ani-
mal human interface and is a major challenge to the fu-
ture health of mankind. According to the World Bank
the cumulative impacts by 2050 are $100 trillion and 10
million human deaths annually. Agriculture and aqua-
culture contribute to direct transmission of resistant
strains and AMR dispersion, reduced efficacy threatens
both health and food production.
The One Health Platform was established in 2015 and
is a not for profit foundation under Belgian law. It is a
One Health Scientific Reference Network that aims to
enhance understanding of, and preparedness for current
and future outbreaks of zoonoses, emerging and re-
emerging infectious diseases in humans and animals and
antimicrobial resistance. This includes the ecological and
environmental factors which drive and impact on these
diseases.
As a Scientific Reference Network, the Platform unites
some of the best One Health science researchers and
global experts in its Scientific Advisory Board. In order
to serve the community, the One Health Platform has
built strategic alliances with industry through its Indus-
try Advisory Board and its partners through the One
Health Coalition. Ties with governments are being se-
cured by the establishment of a Governments Group.
They form an informal think tank to safeguard a true
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exchange of ideas, needs and information bridging
science and policy. The Governments Group consists of
government officials responsible for public health, ani-
mal health, environmental health, food safety and global
health security.
As such the Platform is a Strategic Forum of Stake-
holders, with the aim of constructing connections across
One Health Science and One Health Policy - safeguard-
ing Global Health Security. The One Health Platform
strives to achieve gender equality in all internal commit-
tees, congress committees, events and projects.
Epidemics and outbreaks
HIGHLIGHT: addressing zoonotic diseases at the animal-
human-ecosystem interface - future Earth’s top ten
challenges for one health
Peter Daszak, Ecohealth Alliance
A One Health approach can help to understand the
ecological and epidemiological dynamics that shape dis-
ease risks, directly inform disease prevention and control
strategies, help examine threats and opportunities, and
broaden our capacity to proactively address them.
Future Earth’s One HEALTH Global Research Project
conducts an annual horizon scan review of hot topics
for One Health that will profoundly change the future of
health on the planet. These are topics deemed to have
serious potential implications for health, have been
under-emphasized or are emerging issues, and can bene-
fit from new thinking informed by a One Health
perspective.
Big data, artificial intelligence and monitoring earth
systems
Over the next 5 years, the way data is collected, manipu-
lated, and interpreted will fundamentally change the way
the earth’s natural systems will be monitored [1]. This
seismic shift is being led and funded by large organiza-
tions, supported by NGOs, governments, and academia.
The outcome of this combined effort has been described
as an artificial intelligence (AI) platform for the planet,
with applications ranging from monitoring land use
change to detecting disease pathogens. The possibility to
combine data from a wide range of applications and do-
mains changes how problems can be framed and how
potential solution pathways can be identified and ap-
plied. It can improve monitoring of earth systems with
subsequent improvements in decision making and long-
term policy development and can improve detection of
novel potential pathogens.
The global virome project
The Global Virome Project (GVP) represents a general
trend in pathogen discovery whereby rapid, cheap se-
quencing coupled with better understanding of wildlife-
host disease ecology is leading to a revolution in viral
discovery. The GVP’s goals are to discover over 70% of
the currently unknown viral diversity in mammals and
water birds that normally harbor viruses that could po-
tentially cause disease in people. This will revolutionize
our ability to understand risk of emerging diseases, pre-
dict where and when pathogens could emerge, and
design new mitigation strategies, including avoidance be-
haviors, vaccines and drugs. The background ecological
and anthropological data collected by the GVP and other
projects will contribute to our knowledge of wildlife bio-
diversity and distribution, with potential positive conser-
vation benefits.
Mitigating the underlying drivers of EIDs
Emerging infectious diseases (EIDs) are almost entirely
due to anthropogenic drivers such as socioeconomic and
environmental changes. Our current strategies to deal
with EIDs as a major public health threat rely on vac-
cines, drugs and behavioral intervention after they
emerge. This has led to a series of large-scale outbreaks
causing high mortality, morbidity and significant eco-
nomic shocks (e.g. the West African Ebola virus out-
break) leading to mobilization of significant resources in
response. Analysis of global trends in EIDs suggest that
they are increasing in a non-linear manner and that their
economic impact is increasing exponentially [2]. Thus,
new strategies to deal with their underlying drivers
would be more cost-effective as a strategy to combat this
rise in pandemic risk.
Gene editing technology
Gene editing technology has become increasingly accur-
ate and affordable in recent years with the advent of the
CRISPR-CAS9 gene editing system. The most immediate
benefits center around treating, curing, and preventing
genetic and non-communicable disease in humans, but
the implications for global health go far beyond editing
the human genome. About 750 million people live in ex-
treme poverty in the world. Harnessing gene editing to
modify livestock and agricultural products may lead to
disease resistant domesticated plants and animals, as
well as to more productive varieties that can survive and
thrive in unusual and changing climates. However, this
technology has potential challenges and opportunities
that require a One Health lens to help assess and bal-
ance risks and benefits.
Anthropogenic evolution and synanthropic species
Humans influence the evolution of species and charac-
teristics through artificial selection and domestication
processes. In addition, human activity drives the selec-
tion process, and creates environments that favor species
tolerant to modern civilization. Antibiotics, translocation
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of exotic species, wildlife trade, pollution, and deforest-
ation are additional anthropogenic activities that are
contributing to biodiversity loss. We are also seeing evi-
dence of vectors, reservoir hosts, and pathogens that
were influenced by human activity in the past 10,000
years emerging as more problematic and resilient infec-
tious diseases [3]. These newly configured synanthropic
species will emerge as significant health and biodiversity
challenges in modern landscapes.
Mechanisms and manifestations of disease transmission
Although significant strides have been made in discover-
ing the underlying mechanisms of infectious disease mani-
festation and transmission, more research is necessary to
understand how these mechanisms differ under various
ecological and anthropogenic changes [4]. Models describ-
ing the chain of events in detail leading to a transmission
of known viruses can be applied to unknown pathogens in
theoretical emergence events to better understand disease
spread [5]. Systematic long-term monitoring of pathogen
circulation and interspecies interactions may provide valu-
able insight on predictive trends or risk factors for disease
emergence events.
Crowdsourcing and private funding
Over the next decade, we project a continued increase in
the percentage of research funding from sources outside
of government agency expert-directed and peer-
reviewed grant programs. Crowdfunding for research
and implementation projects provides opportunities for
efforts that may not fit government agency priorities but
appeal to members of civil society [6]. It allows for
innovation by supporting new researchers and new
ideas. It also challenges scientists to explain their efforts
and anticipated research outcome in terms that are more
easily understood by the general public, thus stimulating
more public engagement in the process of science.
Mass mortality events
In recent decades, several sudden disease-driven mass
mortality events have made conservation scientists take
seriously into account the health aspect of conservation.
The emergence of deadly diseases and infections has
highlighted the need to deeply analyze these events, as
the drivers prove to be multifactorial, having complex
webs of causation that require profound and dedicated
investigation. In developing countries, wildlife mortality
events are rarely pursued past standard outbreak investi-
gative procedures. This lack of proper response and deep
investigation is due to limited capacity and resources,
and in some cases, corruption at the government level.
This problem constitutes a major challenge if we are to
understand wildlife health in developing countries, and
its implications in One Health at a global level.
Economic optimum for land development
Land use change is a leading driver of ecosystem degrad-
ation and desertification, biodiversity loss, contamination
of clean water sources, climate change, and infectious
disease emergence [7]. As global population and
urbanization rates rise, the potential for negative human
health consequences from land use change increases.
Programs and projects designed to find the economic
optimum of land development and create flexible, pre-
dictive models are vital to engage stakeholders to make
safe and educated long-term policy decisions that
maximize both public and private benefits. Making in-
formed decisions on land use change can drastically re-
duce the negative economic impact on the local
community, and avoid crises such as outbreaks of en-
demic diseases, and other small-scale epidemics.
Financial risk-rating instruments for disease outbreaks
The economic consequences of outbreaks extend far be-
yond the health sector, with recent epidemics inflicting
significant losses on travel, tourism, extractive industries,
agriculture, education, and more [8]. Innovative risk-
based financing mechanisms are increasingly being pur-
sued to avoid potential catastrophic losses associated
with pandemics. The creation of pandemic insurance
markets, while providing a mechanism to mobilize re-
sources for containment and recovery, at present seeks
to assist countries in their response and recovery, but
lack incentives for prevention. If recent trends continue,
the pace of disease emergence and spread threatens to
make response efforts and insurance payouts cost
prohibitive.
HIGHLIGHT: changing the future of epidemic response
Patrick Drury, Khristeen Umali, Renee Christensen,
Sameera Suri - The Global Outbreak Alert and Response
Network, World Health Organization
This highlight presents an overview of the activities
and future direction of a key WHO program that pools
human and technical resources for rapid identification,
confirmation and response to outbreaks of international
importance.
The Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network
(GOARN) is a network of over 240 public health institu-
tions, international organizations, non-governmental or-
ganizations, UN Agencies, and disease specific, and
technical networks. GOARN is an integral part of the
WHO Health Emergencies Program (WHE), providing a
mechanism to coordination international technical as-
sistance; and to add direct technical assistance and oper-
ational capabilities to WHO’s traditional technical and
normative roles.
WHE works with countries and partners to prepare
for, prevent, respond to and recover from all-hazards
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that create health emergencies, including disease out-
breaks, conflicts, and disasters. WHO leads and coordi-
nates the international health response to contain
disease outbreaks and provide effective relief and recov-
ery to affected people.
The Health Emergency Program is built on timely, all-
hazard alert, risk assessment and response to every sig-
nificant new acute public health event around the world.
Strengthening partnership with GOARN, the Global
Health Cluster, Emergency Medical Teams; and Stand-
by partners is essential for comprehensive assessment
and planning of response, and for coordinated and pre-
dictable collective action, and support to countries and
affected communities and populations. The WHO
Health Emergency Programme also focuses on national
prevention and preparedness plans and capabilities, and
high-consequence disease-specific prevention and con-
trol strategies. Finally, WHE incorporates implementa-
tion of the WHO country business model in high-risk
countries with protracted emergencies.
Active daily, worldwide
On a daily basis, all regions of WHO and headquarters
are involved in global event-based surveillance using for-
mal and informal sources of information. The same sys-
tem is used worldwide, whether in Manila in the
Western Pacific, Washington DC for the Pan-American
Health Organization, Brazzaville for sub-Saharan Africa,
and the other regional offices. This process of event-
based surveillance includes working closely with the
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United
Nations, and the World Organization for Animal Health
(OIE) on zoonosis and acute emerging threats and dis-
ease outbreaks. Daily work involves verifying acute
events and offering technical assistance and support. In
this respect, WHO relies on GOARN partners for inter-
national coordinate, and to deploy response teams; while
partners rely on WHO for leadership, information, logis-
tics and security.
GOARN at a glance
GOARN was established in April 2000 with a founding
group of 60 institutions and has grown to currently
comprise a network of 248 institutions worldwide. It’s
guided by a 21-member Steering Committee (SCOM)
and Working Groups. WHO acts as an Operational Sup-
port Team and a Secretariat for GOARN.
The aims of GOARN are to coordinate rapid inter-
national support teams, provide assistance to countries
to investigate and characterize events, assess risks,
strengthen outbreak response, and support national out-
break preparedness.
GOARN’s partners and networks work in a global and
regional approach (Fig. 1a-b):
The two most recent deployments are both in Africa.
One is in response to the Ebola outbreak in the Equa-
teur Province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC). Two hundred and eighty-five staff are deployed
by WHO in the field - of whom, 37 are directly from
GOARN partners. The other response is for the major
Listeria outbreak in South Africa, where two GOARN
staff were deployed to support and working with local
agencies and partners to identify the specific food pro-
duction site as the source of outbreak.
GOARN moves into the future
As part of its review process, the WHO Global Health
Crises Task Force remarked that robust security systems
are critical for GOARN operations and for a strong
WHO technical, logistics and operational platform cap-
able of supporting countries and coordinating inter-
national response. It was recommended that WHO
should strengthen its partnership with GOARN to en-
hance surveillance (alert and early warning), risk assess-
ment and risk communication, and response. Moreover,
WHO should encourage long-term investments in part-
ners, to ensure increased standing response capacity;
and in the strategic development of GOARN, to inte-
grated national, regional and global capabilities; and
build and integrate a network-of-networks providing
capacity and rapid response for the health operations
and research in the field – including social sciences, risk
communication and community engagement, field epi-
demiology, operational analysis and planning, laboratory
capacity, infection prevention and control, and case
management. In turn, GOARN should support the
WHO Health Emergencies Program with technical and
operational innovation, and networking that will drive
effective preparation, alert and response to public health
emergencies.
As a result, the GOARN Steering Committee came up
with a set of ideas and plans to ensure that the network
remains fit for purpose going forward. All these plans have
been endorsed by the whole network, with a key recom-
mendation among partners being to “think One Health”
and engage partners and stakeholders accordingly.
A first requirement is for GOARN to be engaged
more actively to support national institutions in alert,
risk assessment, and response planning. This means
refocusing the constituency of GOARN by directly in-
volving in-country technical agencies and partners
that are dealing with any particular event, as well as
the regional and global stakeholders that can provide
additional capacity and support, if requested. One of
the ways this is being put into practice is via a weekly
teleconference to coordination on acute events which
includes FAO and OIE and the appropriate local part-
ner. For example, in responding to the current
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outbreak of Ebola in Equateur, this includes regional
partners, and when possible national agencies. Like-
wise, during the recent Lassa fever outbreak in
Nigeria, the Nigerian Centre for Disease Control
(NCDC) lead the response planning and participated
actively with international partners. For the listeria
outbreak in South Africa, the National Institute for
Communicable Diseases (NICD) South Africa – a
long standing partner in GOARN – provided tech-
nical information and kept international partners
Fig. 1 a and b Between 2000 and 2018, GOARN deployed 134 field missions in 87 countries. This translates to approximately 2787 field
deployments or 82,359 person-days in the field
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abreast of development in the outbreak, the focus of
investigations, and response.
A further area for development is the building of rapid
response capacities and teams. With so many events and
the potential for any one of them to accelerate out of
control, WHO and GOARN face great pressure to be
able to identify very rapidly the core expertise – which
often needs to be individually tailored – that can be de-
ployed in a highly scalable way.
Training remains essential, and this will include out-
break response scenario-based training. Twenty-seven
institutions are already working on the development of a
tiered training program and its translation into different
languages. This is a significant source of additional cap-
acity that is available for field deployment.
Communications also needs to be firmly embedded in
the network’s approach, enabling outbreaks of potential
international concern to be identified; public health in-
formation to be communicated; international risk assess-
ment to be offered; and direct technical and operational
assistance to the affected country to be provided.
GOARN 2.0 in a nutshell
In short, GOARN 2.0 involves an expanded and intensi-
fied involvement of partners in a range of activities, and
possible engagement with new partners from public, pri-
vate and civil society. The Steering Committee will pro-
vide leadership on collaboration and strengthen the
network by attracting and retaining the best institutions.
Partners and the Operational Support Team need to be
well-resourced, and it’s essential to advance this shared
vision and consensus on the priorities of GOARN.
HIGHLIGHT: empowering communities for the
containment of infectious outbreaks
Christophe Longuet, CORDS
The Connecting Organization for Regional Diseases
Surveillance (CORDS) is a non-profit NGO located in
Lyon, France. It was founded in December 2007 at a
meeting of Public Health Surveillance Networks at the
Rockefeller Bellagio Center in Italy, where representa-
tives of the networks were gathering to share lessons
learned, best practices and challenges.
CORDS receives funding from the Rockefeller Founda-
tion, Skoll Global Threats Fund, the Bill & Melinda
Gates Foundation, NTI, Fondation Mérieux, Search for
Common Ground, the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs and the West African Health Organization.
CORDS has three strategic pillars: to promote
innovation, improve capacity and build sustainable net-
works, all within the One Health framework. Its overall
mission is to catalyze exchange and collaboration
amongst regional disease surveillance networks,
throughout the world, to strengthen their capacity to
detect and control the spread of epidemics. This is trans-
lated into practice by pursuing four key actions:
– Further strengthening national capacity and regional
networks based on effective communication through
electronic means, regular meetings and joint projects
– Promoting and enhancing the overall global capacity
for infectious disease surveillance by connecting its
regional networks into a global cooperative activity
– Developing and encouraging collaboration between
the human, animal and agricultural sectors to
achieve a holistic approach to infectious disease
surveillance
– Promoting the development of national capacities
and new regional networks, particularly in Africa
and South Asia.
CORDS is comprised of six regional networks working
to detect and control the spread of infectious diseases by
exchanging information between surveillance systems
(Fig. 2):
The solution needs to be the community solution
CORDS has a clear focus on the community, and aims
to ensure that communities are safe from the spread of
infectious diseases in animals and humans, by containing
outbreaks at source. To enable this, communities have
to be empowered, so CORDS is keen to develop and
offer new and innovative tools to better empower com-
munities. For example, the use of participatory surveil-
lance tools can help communities make informed
decisions about their health, with links between primary,
secondary and tertiary levels of care.
CORDS also wants to see communities working to-
gether closely across borders to prevent and control re-
gional epidemics, and also believes that community-level
needs can play a key role in informing global health
policy.
Four innovative projects at community level
In the CORDS’ MECIDS network (Middle East Consor-
tium on Infectious Disease Surveillance), a seroepide-
miological study was conducted to identify the
transmission in Jordan, Israel and Palestinian authorities
of the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus
(MERS-coV). Current scientific evidence suggests that
dromedary camels are a major reservoir host for MERS-
CoV and an animal source of MERS infection in
humans.
The study concluded that despite the mass gathering
and extremely intensive population “mixing”, pilgrimage
to Mecca was not associated with an increased risk of
MERS-CoV acquisition. No subclinical infection was de-
tected in samples from the general population of camel
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owners. And no camel to human transmission was iden-
tified by screening with Euroimmun ELISA (Prof.
Dany Cohen, MECIDS, unpublished report). However,
studies are still underway with more sensitive and spe-
cific assays at the Erasmus MC Laboratory Rotterdam,
the Netherlands, and further studies are needed to fur-
ther examine transmission of MERS-coV in the region.
Also via MECIDS, in Albania, Jordan and Pakistan, a
Leishmaniasis gap analysis was conducted. Leishman-
iasis is a neglected disease, in that it affects neglected or
marginalized peoples, but is the second most prevalent
parasitic infection in the world after malaria. Jordan is a
hot spot for Leishmaniasis, with increased cases due to
the influx of Syrian refugees. The investigation covered
the status of Leishmaniasis and the current surveillance,
treatment and control activities in each country, with a
critical evaluation of the effectiveness of these activities.
A number of common findings were published (Dr.
S. Bino SECIDS, Dr. K. Kanani, MECIDS, Dr. S. M.
Mursalin, POHA, unpublished reports). No popula-
tion control measures were in place and no active
surveillance was carried out in dogs, nor was there
any vector control program dedicated for sand flies.
Case detection and clinical management protocols
were outdated, while there was only intermittent or
a lack of medication in public hospitals and a lack
of diagnostic tests. In short, the capacity for early
disease detection at regional or district levels was
low, and there was also a low community perception
and a lack of community programs, especially in
poor areas. The recommendation was to have Inte-
grated One Health surveillance incorporating case
management, vector control and animal reservoir
control.
The APEIR network of CORDS (Asia Partnership on
Emerging Infectious Diseases Research), with support
from the International Development Research Centre
(IDRC) Canada, implemented a 5-year study to explore,
develop, and assess the effectiveness of a strategy for the
proper use of antimicrobials in humans and animals to
control antimicrobial resistance in Indonesia, Thailand,
Vietnam, Laos and some regions of China (Prof. A. Soe-
bandrio, APEIR, unpublished report).
During these 5 years, baseline surveys were conducted
of antibiotic use and access, along with an E. coli sensi-
tivity survey in human, animal and environmental iso-
lates. The public health and animal health workforces in
these countries were also trained.
A further project is being conducted in Tanzania by
the SACIDS (Southern African Centre for Infectious
Disease Surveillance) network of CORDS. Afyadata is
a tool that analyzes data collected from the field and
intelligently sends feedback to the data collector and
alerts higher authority officials if any abnormal pat-
tern is discovered in the data collected. It aims to
empower the community to perform animal and
human health surveillance with simple tools that
they own. With this tool, communities have been able
Fig. 2 The CORDS’ member networks
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to rapidly provide alerts and consequently receive fast
response, enabling them to protect their animals and
population.
From March to May 2017, a total of 212 livestock
cases and 10 human cases were reported by Community
Health Reporters using Afyadata in the Ngorongoro and
Morogoro districts. The tool has helped communities
learn a lot about what kinds of diseases are in their lo-
cality and how to manage them (Prof. M. Rweyemamu,
SACIDS, unpublished report).
CORDS’ messages for policymakers
Infectious disease outbreaks that pose a threat to the pub-
lic health often emerge from close contact between ani-
mals – domestic or wild – and humans, in underserved
regions. They can swiftly cross borders without being
identified, particularly in countries with poor surveillance
systems. Efforts to stop their spread must start at “the first
mile”, where communities should be empowered to par-
ticipate in early identification of, and response to, emer-
ging infectious diseases in a One Health approach.
It’s therefore vital to think and act at community level
to achieve Global Health Security. This means under-
standing the needs of communities and providing them
with sustainable benefits and acceptable solutions.
Health also extends beyond physical, psychological and
social well-being; “economical health” is also important,
for example by ensuring that laws that enable farmers to
seek compensation for the loss of livestock are enforced.
Strengthening health systems for humans and animals
in underserved regions is key. In this respect it’s important
to have national laboratory and national public health in-
stitutions not only in existence, but closely connected to
the communities and the care system to enable outbreaks
to be identified. Also essential is to build excellent surveil-
lance and care systems for humans and animals.
Finally, communication is key, which means strength-
ening relationships with the underserved communities,
as well as with scientists, decision-makers – in health,
agriculture and other sectors – and between regions, as
challenges faced in different parts of the world are often
similar. Solutions identified in some regions can there-
fore be usefully applied in other countries and conti-
nents. CORDS therefore proposes South-South-North
collaborations based on trust at community, cross-
border and cross-region levels.
ACTION: 1st international one health forum, November
2019, Africa
Recent global disease events have highlighted the impact
of zoonoses on human and animal health. It is clear that
cooperative solutions are needed to address biological
threats and thus global health security. Zoonotic diseases
account for more than one billion cases and a million
deaths per year, according to the World Bank. Public
health systems will only grow stronger by applying a hol-
istic view on the health of humans, animals and the en-
vironment, thus calling for a One Health approach. In
addition, we have entered a new era of (re-)emerging
and recurring global health threats that call for a longer-
term, more strategic approach to global health security.
Across the African continent, initiatives have already
been set up. Thus, meetings are being organised, and
networks established that adopt the One Health ap-
proach, engaging public health practitioners, scientists,
policy makers and workforce. Yet, these initiatives are
not well connected nor integrated.
Established in January 2017, the Africa Centres for
Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) is a new
public health agency of the African Union. Africa CDC
seeks to make Africa safer and healthier by strengthen-
ing Africa’s health institutions, particularly its national
public health institutes (NPHIs). One Health presents a
challenge for NPHIs, because there is no Africa-wide
consensus for the public health practice of One Health,
including surveillance and disease control. For surveil-
lance, critical questions include:
(a) what diseases should NPHIs focus on?
(b) how should NPHIs conduct surveillance for those
diseases in the human health sector?
(c) what tools should NPHIs use to assess risk,
inclusion thresholds for investigation and control in
collaboration with the animal health sector?
The International One Health Forum focussed on
strengthening the public health practice of NPHIs in
Africa by convening representatives from existing One
Health initiatives and networks and having them
present their recommendations for best practices re-
garding zoonotic disease surveillance. Substantial work
on building consensus for One Health public health
practice has already been developed by WHO, FAO,
OIE, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion, and other partners. In addition, many African
countries have conducted disease prioritization work-
shops and initiated programs for surveillance and con-
trol of specific zoonotic diseases. While NPHIs serve
the human health sector, the Forum ensured adequate
representation from animal and environmental sectors
to ensure that recommendations for prioritization, sur-
veillance, and risk assessment include input from all
relevant sectors.
Three questions were at the core of the 1st Inter-
national One Health Forum:
1. What are the top zoonotic diseases of importance
across the African continent?
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2. How should NPHIs conduct surveillance for a
selection or all of these priority zoonotic
diseases?
3. How do NPHIs assess the risk of zoonotic cases and
clusters in collaboration with animal and
environmental sectors?
Biological threats
HIGHLIGHT: strengthening global biological security - a
global perspective on biological threats and decision
making
Rebecca Katz PhD MPH, Georgetown University Medical
Center, Washington D.C., USA
An overview of global biological threats, who are the
actors deciding how to address these threats, and on
what data are these decisions based?
Biological threats
Emerging infectious diseases are increasing in number.
We see examples every year, including the emergence of
new coronaviruses (https://www.nih.gov/news-events/
news-releases/new-coronavirus-emerges-bats-china-dev-
astates-young-swine). New studies estimate that there
are over 1 million viruses in mammals, and approxi-
mately half of those have the potential to threaten hu-
man health. At the same time, risk factors are
increasing. The world is more interconnected than ever
before, with closer inter-relationships between humans,
animals and environmental health. Climate change,
population growth, urbanization and human migration
all contribute to the likelihood of biological threats.
Never too far away from the news headlines is the de-
liberate use of biological agents, or the geopolitical shifts
that can lead to the possibility of state or non-state actor
use of biological weapons in conflicts. And, advances in
science and technology are capable of both positively
impacting the ways we investigate and respond to bio-
logical threats, as well as contributing to the biological
threat in the first place.
How do we think about policy and response to biological
threats?
Preparing for and responding to biological events is
complicated by the fact that no two events are the same.
To demonstrate this complexity, we developed a frame-
work to categorize biological events based on the 12
characteristics that drive planning and response
decision-making (such as event origin, type, route of
transmission, outbreak location, response level etc.). It
generated approximately 22 million notional events
(Fig. 3), which clearly demonstrates just how diverse the
biological threat is, as well as how response planning
must be able to adapt to an increasingly broad range of
scenarios (https://bioscenarios.talusanalytics.com/).
Preparedness though, however complicated, is essen-
tial. At the Munich Security Conference in February
2017, Bill Gates and his team of modelers indicated that
the threat of a large-scale pandemic is very real: “A fast-
moving airborne pathogen could kill more than 30
million people in less than a year … and there is a rea-
sonable probability the world will experience such an
outbreak in the next 10-15 years”.
It is frightening to talk about a catastrophic pandemic,
but also challenging to engage decision makers in low
probability events. The World Health Organization
(WHO), however, screens approximately 3000 signals a
month, follows up on 300 of these and closely investi-
gates 30 per month, meaning that there are very real
biological threats happening every day. Recent outbreaks
include Ebola in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
HIV cases in Pakistan, Dengue fever on Réunion Island,
and MERS-CoV in Saudi Arabia (https://www.who.int/
csr/don/en/).
The economic burden of biological threats will un-
doubtedly be enormous. Experts estimate that a global
influenza pandemic could cost USD 570 billion [9]. This
isn’t too far short of the potential economic impact of
climate change, which has been estimated at USD 890
billion.
Who is addressing these threats?
There is no easy answer to this question, because ad-
dressing biological threats involves many activities, from
preparedness, detection, reporting, response, recovery,
investigation to governance. All these activities require
experts in a vast number of fields; just a short list
includes epidemiology, lab diagnostics, risk communica-
tion, emergency management, clinical medicine, logis-
tics, operations & leadership, command & control,
microbial forensics, data mining, anthropology, social
science, and media relations. And when a biological
threat is potentially deliberate, identifying all the relevant
stakeholders involved in addressing and responding to
the threat becomes even more complex (Fig. 4) (https://
dbe.talusanalytics.com/).
Frameworks for biological threats are diverse, ran-
ging from local implementation guidelines through na-
tional policies, strategies and regulations up to regional
and ultimately international agreements. Coordination is
provided by international organizations such as the
World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), the Food
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Na-
tions, and the World Health Organization (WHO), along
with multilateral groups such as the Global Health Se-
curity Agenda (GHSA) and the Global Partnership
Program.
A useful way to consider the drivers of decisions re-
garding biological threats is the traditional hierarchy of
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foreign policy governance functions developed, described
by David Fidler in 2006 [10], with high politics at the
top and soft power at the bottom: public health normally
resides in the low part of the spectrum. However, what’s
noteworthy is that over the past decade, addressing glo-
bal health – and biological threats in particular – has be-
come part of the high foreign policy functions, with an
increasing emphasis on global health security. It’s im-
portant to recognize that it’s the security component
that really drives engagement by foreign policy functions
of government.
Another major driver is resources. Unprecedented
levels of resources are being channeled into global
health activities. For example, the Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation now stands alongside UN agencies,
the World Bank and bilateral development agencies
as the leading contributors to global health. Since
1990 there has been a quadrupling in global health
expenditures. This trend is also echoed in voluntary
contributions; over 70% of all funding to WHO
comes from these sources.
As to the global health actors who are addressing bio-
logical threats, they come from both public and private
sectors. This is a rapidly evolving field – and conse-
quently increasingly crowded – incorporating public-
private partnerships, international finance institutions,
trade organizations, self-empowered individuals, philan-
thropic capitalists, non-governmental organizations and
civil society.
What evidence is used to make decisions?
When it comes to making decisions on biological
threats, it’s important to consider what evidence is be-
ing used to inform actions. Possible sources of this
Fig. 3 Response planning must be able to adapt to an increasingly broad range of scenarios. Available at: https://bioscenarios.talusanalytics.com
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evidence are academic papers, public opinion, social
media, conference presentations and internal data ana-
lytics. Often, however, we must admit that sometimes
the factors that contribute to decision making is linked
to whomever the loudest or most powerful person in
the room is, recognizing that power might come from a
variety of sources.
There are, however, extensive efforts by the inter-
national community to generate data that can be used
as evidence to support actions. The Joint External
Evaluation (JEE) of the WHO is a voluntary, collabora-
tive, multisectoral process to assess the ability and cap-
acity of countries to prevent, detect and rapidly
respond to biological threats. It helps countries identify
the most critical gaps within their public health systems
and then prioritize opportunities for preparedness and
response.
Drawing from and complementing the JEE are ef-
forts such as the forthcoming Global Health Security
Index which will provide a public benchmarking of
global health security conditions and compliance with
international standards for epidemic preparedness.
Additionally, coalitions are being created to monitor
and evaluate efforts and mechanisms at country and
global levels to address biological threats. Such initia-
tives aim to ensure that the key decisions on biological
threats are being made by the right actors, based on
the right data.
Fig. 4 a and b Epidemiological curve and associated policies when a biological threat is potentially deliberate. Available at: dbe.talusanalytics.com
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HIGHLIGHT: biological threat reduction strategies
Keith Hamilton, World Organisation for Animal Health
(OIE)
This highlight provides an overview of some of the
biological threat reduction strategies being implemented
throughout the world.
There are many ways to define a biological threat (bio-
threat). Merriam-Webster defines it as a threat posed by a
harmful biological agent, while the US Department of
Defense calls it a threat that consists of biological material
to be deployed to produce casualties in personnel or ani-
mals or damage plants. At the World Organisation for
Animal Health (OIE), we define a biothreat as “the acci-
dental or deliberate release of a pathogen or toxin into a
susceptible population.” This could include biocrime, bio-
logical warfare, bioterrorism, agroterrorism and agro-
crime, depending on the perpetrator and the target.
The timeline below (Fig. 5) displays confirmed use of
animal pathogens or toxins used in biological warfare,
biocrime or bioterrorism through the centuries, and
clearly highlights that the threats are real, and are not
going away. Because the capability to synthesize and en-
gineer genes is becoming more widely available, and can
be done at lower cost, threats from the misuse of patho-
gens may be increasing.
Moreover, biological threats in whatever form have huge
impacts on human life, national and global economies, the
supply of food, and civil stability. These impacts are often
connected. For example, it does not take long for a food
shortage to lead to civil instability. The quote along the
lines of ‘any society is only three meals from a revolution’
has been attributed to numerous leaders and philosophers.
The health-security intersection
When it comes to the development and implementation
of strategies and activities surrounding biological threats,
the health and security sectors share a number of com-
mon interests. These include a commitment to peace,
stability and prosperity; strong mechanisms to prevent,
detect and respond to disease outbreaks; sustainable,
safe, and secure laboratories; responsible scientists; and
a global approach. Cooperative threat reduction is built
around these common interests.
Biothreat reduction strategies can and do address dif-
ferent levels: global, societal, national, field and labora-
tory. Some strategies work at all levels, while others
work across just one level, indicating that in real life,
biological threat reduction strategies are a complex mix
of horizontal, top-down and bottom-up approaches. For
maximum impact and effective use of resources these
strategies should be well coordinated, synergistic, and
adapted to the local context.
The cooperative threat reduction program
The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, also
known as the Nunn-Lugar Act after the work done by
Fig. 5 Timeline showing confirmed use of animal pathogens or toxins used in biological warfare, biocrime or bioterrorism through the centuries
(Developed by Keith Hamilton and Bruno Bastos)
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US senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, was created
in 1986 and is a good example of a biothreat reduction
strategy. It was established for the purpose of securing
and dismantling weapons of mass destruction and their
associated infrastructure in the former states of the So-
viet Union. It was also a response to knowledge that bio-
threat material existed across the USSR in different
locations, and therefore focused on securing those mate-
rials and making sure they didn’t fall into the wrong
hands such as rogue states or terrorists, hence it was de-
scribed as “proliferation in reverse.”
The program looked into nuclear, chemical and bio-
logical threats. The first two threats involve dismantling
equipment and warheads; biological threat reduction is a
little more complicated as it also involves engaging
scientists to make sure they are not tempted to be
employed by other countries or groups intent on devel-
oping biological weapons. It also involves securing
pathogens and making sure they are held in high con-
tainment facilities.
The objectives of the CTR Program – which align very
closely with the aims of the health sector on this topic –
are to consolidate and secure dangerous pathogen col-
lections into central reference labs or repositories; to
improve the safety and security of biological facilities; to
enhance partner states’ capabilities to detect, diagnose,
and report bio-terror attacks and potential pandemics;
and to engage scientists with biological weapon-related
expertise in research and careers that support peaceful
objectives such as health protection, medical counter-
measures, diagnostics.
Global partnership against the spread of weapons and
materials of mass destruction
Known in short as the Global Partnership (GP), this is a
different type of strategy that works at a truly inter-
national level. It’s a 31-member international initiative
that aims to prevent the proliferation of chemical, bio-
logical, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons and
related materials. The European Union is one of the 31
members, which in effect adds another 28 countries to
the membership list. A number of organizations such as
OIE, WHO, FAO and Interpol participate as observers.
The Global Partnership was established at the 2002 G8
Kananaskis summit.
In practice, the GP operates through several working
groups that address specific threats. These groups agree
on deliverables which they can all work towards as a co-
operative. One such working group is the GP Biosecurity
Sub-Working Group (BSWG). It has stipulated a num-
ber of deliverables, many of which are very closely
aligned to the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program
described earlier:
1. Secure and account for materials that represent
biological proliferation risks
2. Develop and maintain appropriate and effective
measures to prevent, prepare for, and respond to
the deliberate misuse of biological agents
3. Strengthen national and global networks to rapidly
identify, confirm and respond to biological attacks
4. Reinforce and strengthen biological non-
proliferation principles, practices and instruments
5. Reduce proliferation risks through the advancement
and promotion of safe and responsible conduct in
the biological sciences.
OIE biological threat reduction strategy
The OIE understands the importance of working with
the health and security sectors and is committed to a
world that is safe and secure from the accidental or de-
liberate release of animal pathogens, including zoonoses.
Its biological threat reduction strategy aligns with its 6th
strategic plan and falls under the umbrella of risk man-
agement. It is based on the OIE philosophy of solidarity
and cooperation and adheres to the principle that the
same mechanisms protect against natural, accidental and
deliberate releases.
The focus of the OIE strategy is on strengthening, en-
hancing, and developing cross-links between existing
health systems. Moreover, OIE sees the importance of
engaging its membership in any new strategy and is
therefore transparent about the objectives of the strategy
and its implementation, all of which are shared with its
members. OIE has also held two global conferences on
biological threat reduction, to which OIE’s members and
partners were invited to attend and provide their input.
The OIE Biological Threat Reduction Strategy has de-
livered a number of concrete outputs. OIE now operates
a Collaborating Centre on biological threat reduction,
which provide training and technical support to coun-
tries throughout the world. The OIE, jointly with FAO,
has implemented a post rinderpest eradication strategy
which has led to the sequestration and destruction of
rinderpest virus material to avoid a laboratory accident
or deliberate release; approval of several safe and secure
rinderpest holding facilities to store remaining stocks of
virus; and a ban on research involving the handling or
manipulation of rinderpest virus, unless approved by
OIE and FAO. The OIE has also worked on strengthen-
ing surveillance networks that can detect the possibility
of deliberate release of biological agents (as well as nat-
ural disease outbreaks) and has developed guidance for
its member countries on how to investigate suspicious
animal or health events which might indicate some ne-
farious activity. This also involves engaging with the law
enforcement sector.
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A number of disease outbreak simulation exercises
have been held to test the response of countries to dis-
ease outbreaks, whether they have been natural or delib-
erate. OIE has also worked to support and strengthen
veterinary services (and legislation) to better comply
with OIE’s standards.
Experience has shown that the sustainability of cap-
acity building efforts is a real challenge.
Recently, a sustainable laboratories initiative has been
launched in collaboration with Chatham House. This
initiative aims to better understand the determinants of
laboratory sustainability and to identify solutions which
will improve the sustainability of laboratories in the lon-
ger term, meeting both the needs of the health and se-
curity sectors. OIE also reaches out to and works with
other agencies that share a common interest to tackle
biological threats, such as Interpol, the Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) of the UN, the
UN Security Council Resolution 1540 which deals with
nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, and the UN Of-
fice for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA).
Advantages of cooperation at the health-security
intersection
If both the health and security sectors succeed in ad-
dressing common interests, it’s a win-win situation.
Conversely, if one sector fails, it’s a failure for both
sectors. Cooperation of the health and security sectors
is an efficient use of resources. It’s also a sustainable
way to invest in mechanisms that respond both to
day-to-day events as well as to unusual events such
as intentional releases. Finally, synergy brings about
increased effectiveness.
The health-security intersection is built on common
goals and interests and provides concrete outputs that
benefit both the health and security sectors. However,
with such a hierarchy (or possibly a heterarchy) of
strategies to address biological threat reduction, the
need for in-depth coordination among all parties is
paramount.
HIGHLIGHT: global health security and the future of
biological threat reduction
Dr Maurizio Barbeschi, Sabri Gmach, John Hart, Jesse
McLeay, Gaetano Morelli and Jan van Aken.
WHO, Health Emergencies Programme
Through its 13th General Programme of Work,
2019–2023, the World Health Organization (WHO)
aims to ensure healthy lives and to promote well-
being for all through achieving universal health cover-
age, addressing health emergencies and promoting
healthier populations. These three interlinked strategic
priorities are founded on the Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals (SDGs) of the United Nations. In practice
this means that at least 1 billion more people must
obtain access to essential health services in each five-
year period between 2015 and 2030, be better pro-
tected from health emergencies, and enjoy better
health and well-being. These objectives are operation-
alized by utilizing the revised 2005 International
Health Regulations (IHRs) and a health emergency
preparedness strategic framework for the promotion
of intersectoral public health security coordination.
Preparedness and response to disease outbreaks
A range of planning factors and sustainable capacity
building are required to ensure effective preparedness
and response to disease outbreaks. An epidemic typically
involves human-to-human transmission, nosocomial
transmission in health care facilities, or transmission
from animals to humans (zoonosis).
A pandemic may be understood as “the globalization
of pathogens”, which not surprisingly is exacerbated by
global travel of people, animals and vectors, and global
trade of animals and their products, vaccines, medical
products.
Factors that contribute to epidemics may include
urbanization, mass gatherings, and accidental or delib-
erate use of biological agents for malicious purposes.
Detection of a deliberate use is more difficult in cases
where the occurrence of a group of similar illnesses
derived from a common source beyond what would
normally be expected in a given community or
region.
The role of the international health regulations
By undertaking to implement the IHRs, 196 countries,
including all WHO Member States, have committed
to strengthen global health security through the early
detection of and effective response to events that pose
a risk to public health. This requires the rapid identi-
fication of unusual public health events through
effective national surveillance systems which link dir-
ectly to the implementation of timely and appropriate
responses.
The IHRs have two fundamental components: 1.
internationally coordinated monitoring, information
sharing & response; and 2. the strengthening of core
public health capacities to detect, assess, respond and
recover in every single country, including at points-
of-entry. The regulations do not distinguish between
naturally occurring, deliberate or accidental spread of
pathogens.
Joint evaluation tool
WHO’s Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Tool is utilized
to evaluate a country’s capacities for health security.
WHO developed the voluntary tool in 2016 and revised
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it in 2018. The JEE’s 19 technical areas are grouped into
the three core elements of prevention, detection, and re-
sponse.1 Countries may use the JEEs to develop tailored
national action plans against biological and chemical
threats.
Is the world prepared?
Despite the work carried out within this framework and
various other international initiatives and commitments,
the question still has to be asked: Are we adequately pre-
pared for public health emergencies, including the delib-
erate release of pathogens?
The IHR core capacities are those required to detect, as-
sess, notify and report events, and respond to public
health risks and emergencies of national and international
concern. The IHR monitoring process involves assessment
of the development and implementation of core capacities
at points-of-entry and for IHR-related hazards. These haz-
ards may be biological, chemical, radio-nuclear in nature.
The implementation and monitoring of core capacities
continues to present a challenge in many technical areas,
including adoption of national legislation, ensuring ef-
fective surveillance and response, establishing laboratory
capacity, human resource development and ensuring
biological, chemical and radio-nuclear safety (Fig. 6):
Effective multisectoral collaboration remains a priority.
WHO, its partners and Member States must continue
working collectively to bridge identified gaps in IHR core
capacities in the most efficient and effective way, using
existing strategic approaches, networks and resources.
Greater international cooperation and coordination, add-
itional tools, further research are required. This can be
partly achieved within a health security interface concep-
tual framework.
WHO health security interface
WHO’s Health Security Interface (HSI) Secretariat core
strategic activities can be separated into three main areas
of work and are pursued simultaneously: Advocating for
the inclusion of public health in the security sector as a
way to reduce global security risks; Increasing WHO
preparedness and response measures to public health
emergencies including deliberate events; and providing
outreach activities within the organization to raise the
awareness and visibility of the health security interface
as a vital component of WHO.
In practice this means improving coordination of HSI-
related activities through the HSI Secretariat and in-
creasing WHO’s global footprint on HSI preparedness at
the policy level. Another key area is to develop partner-
ships with entities providing support in infectious dis-
ease outbreaks, especially those of a deliberate nature,
including in the context of mass gatherings. Monitoring
innovations in science and technology is also a concrete
action, which includes providing timely analysis of health
security interface implications.
HSI has provided ongoing advice to WHO/WHE staff
regarding arising events and implementation of WHO
Resolution WHA 55.16 which relates to global public
health response to natural occurrence, accidental release
or deliberate use of biological and chemical agents or
radio-nuclear material that affect health.
HSI activities include
– Outbreak response operations in non-permissive en-
vironments, such as highly politicized contexts, con-
flicts, and wars
– Deliberate events, including the intentional use of
chemical or biological agents in order to cause harm
– Issues related to mass gatherings, such as major
sporting events, festivals, and regular religious
migrations
– Supporting Member States through a Self-
Assessment Tool, modelled on the JEE, to assess its
specific preparedness and response capabilities for
deliberate events.
– Awareness Raising and Training for WHO staff and
Member States on all aspects of health security
issues, including deliberate events.
WHO HSI engages in multi-sectoral collaboration
with organizations such as Organisation for the Prohib-
ition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), United Nations
Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), United
Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), The
Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Sup-
port Unit, United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), Global Outbreak
Alert and Response Network (GOARN), Food and Agri-
culture Organization (FAO), Organization of Animal
Health (OIE), International Criminal Police Organization
(INTERPOL), the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) and others. Informal contact between
these organizations enables the sharing of information
on events of potential deliberate nature.
HSI has issued an internal report entitled Does
(Public) Health and Security Interface Matter?, which
led to an accepted definition of the Health Security
Interface within WHO. The unit has established an
1National legislation, policy and financing; IHR coordination,
communication and advocacy; Antimicrobial resistance; Zoonotic
disease; Food safety; Biosafety and biosecurity; Immunization; National
laboratory system; Surveillance; Reporting; Human resources;
Emergency Preparedness; Emergency response operations; Linking
public health and security authorities; Medical countermeasures and
personnel deployment; Risk communication; Points of entry; Chemical
events; and Radiation emergencies.
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operational health/security secretariat allowing the fu-
ture coordination of activities related to deliberate
events across headquarters, regional and country of-
fices, as well as the external coordination with outside
organizations.
In late 2018, WHO has established the HSI Tech-
nical Advisory Group (HSI-TAG) to provide advice to
WHO and the WHO Health Emergencies Programme
(WHE) across areas related to the interface between
the public health and security sectors. The group will
act as an advisory body to WHO to strengthen
internal capacities in the health security related fields,
including deliberate events. It will also provide recom-
mendations, as necessary, on matters related to tools,
resources and systems available to WHO. The 17
members of the HSI-TAG are all senior subject mat-
ter experts (SMEs)_representing a broad range of
different scientific areas, public health and the secur-
ity sector.
The future of biological threat reduction requires sus-
tained multisectoral cooperation and commitment at the
national, regional and global levels.
HIGHLIGHT: strengthening global biological security
Trevor Smith, Global Affairs Canada
The threats posed by biological weapons are very
real; collaboration at the global health-security inter-
face can play a key role in mitigating all manner of
biological threats, whether natural, accidental or de-
liberate in origin.
Since the dawn of time, disease has shown itself to be
an extremely efficient and effective weapon of mass de-
struction. Diseases, particularly those caused by high
consequence pathogens, are relentless and adaptive and
have no regard for geographic boundaries or political af-
filiations. For these reason, biological agents have con-
sistently attracted the attention of states, terrorist groups
and individuals with an interest and intent to cause
harm, panic and/or disruption on a wide scale.
The threat
During the twentieth century, numerous countries pur-
sued biological weapons (BW) programs, seeking to har-
ness the destructive power of disease for military
purposes. In an effort to halt this dangerous trend, the
Fig. 6 The implementation and monitoring of core capacities continues to present a challenge in many technical areas (Source: The World
Health Organization)
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Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) was
negotiated and entered into force in 1972, with the aim
of prohibiting the development, production, acquisition,
stockpiling and retention of biological weapons. While
the BTWC currently has 183 States Parties, it lacks a
mechanism by which to independently verify compli-
ance, and multilateral efforts to meaningfully strengthen
the Convention have made little progress in the past two
decades.
The BTWC was intended to prevent States from de-
veloping biological weapons, but non-state actors have
also demonstrated the desire to acquire and the willing-
ness to use biological weapons. In September 2001, let-
ters containing anthrax were mailed in the United
States, killing five people and infecting 17 others.
Though only 5 g of infectious material was used, the im-
pact of the “Amerithrax” letters went far beyond the im-
mediate victims: tens of thousands of people received
antibiotics, millions were terrified and billions of dollars
were spent to deal with the immediate and longer-term
consequences (including hundreds of millions of dollars
to decontaminate affected post offices). In this regard,
the anthrax letters demonstrated that even a modest
scale deliberate biological event can cause mass disrup-
tion and huge economic and social impacts. Not surpris-
ingly, the threat of deliberate use of disease as a weapon
remains an attractive option for many terrorists, as evi-
denced by the numerous thwarted incidents in recent
years.
Natural “proliferation events”
The challenges posed by biological weapons proliferation
and bioterrorism are daunting, particularly given the
natural origin and widespread availability of pathogens,
which are the key ingredient required for development
of a bioweapon. From this perspective, naturally occur-
ring outbreaks of especially dangerous pathogens must
be viewed as potential “proliferation events”, as they gen-
erate samples that could be used to develop a capacity
for biological weapons or bioterrorist attacks. The scale
of the problem is evidenced by the 2014–2016 Ebola
outbreak in West Africa, which produced an estimated
300,000 Ebola samples, stored in dozens of facilities
across multiple countries. In West Arica, as in many
other parts of the world, facilities housing Ebola and
samples of other pathogens of security concern often
have inadequate or no biosafety, biosecurity or tracking
measures in place to ensure that these “dual use” mate-
rials remain out of the hands of those with malign
interests.
A global partnership against weapons of mass destruction
In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 2001 in
the United States and the subsequent “Amerithrax”
letters, the then G8 group of nations came together to
take meaningful action to combat the threat of terrorist
use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
(CBRN) weapons. At their 2002 Summit in Kananaskis,
Canada, G8 Leaders launched the Global Partnership
Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass
Destruction (GP) with a mandate to prevent terrorists
and those that harbor them from acquiring weapons and
materials of mass destruction and their means of deliv-
ery. Initially created as a 10-year, $20 billion initiative
with a focus on CBRN-related challenges in Russia and
other countries of the former Soviet Union, the Global
Partnership delivered impressive results that eliminated
or mitigated a wide range of serious WMD threats. As a
result of its success, the GP was extended and expanded
to address threats posed by weapons and materials of
mass destruction on a global basis. While the Global
Partnership remains a G7-led initiative, it now includes
30 active member countries plus the European Union.
To date, GP members have delivered more than $25 bil-
lion in concrete, tangible programming worldwide in ef-
forts to prevent chemical, biological, radiological and
nuclear proliferation and terrorism.
In 2010, Global Partnership member countries agreed
to place increased emphasis on biological threat reduc-
tion, and identified “strengthening biological security” as
a key priority for collective programming efforts. The
GP developed a set of five biological security “Deliver-
ables” (which were reviewed and updated during Cana-
da’s G7 Presidency in 2018) that commit GP partners to
support efforts to:
 Secure and account for materials that represent
biological proliferation risks;
 Develop and maintain appropriate and effective
measures to prevent, prepare for, detect and disrupt
the deliberate misuse of biological agents;
 Strengthen national and international capabilities to
rapidly identify, confirm/assess and respond to
biological attacks;
 Reinforce and strengthen the BTWC and other
biological disarmament and non-proliferation obliga-
tions, principles, practices and instruments; and
 Reduce biological proliferation risks through the
advancement and promotion of safe and responsible
conduct.
A core principle of GP efforts to mitigate bio-
logical threats and to strengthen global biological se-
curity is the importance of robust partnerships with
the health sector (i.e. human, animal and plant). In
this regard, GP partners have forged enduing,
mutually-supportive collaborations at the “health-se-
curity interface” at the global (e.g. WHO, OIE and
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FAO), regional (e.g. Africa, Asia, Caribbean) and na-
tional levels. GP partners recognize the imperative
for stakeholders from diverse sectors and back-
grounds (e.g. human health, animal health, academia,
development, defense and security) to work together
to prevent, detect and respond to all manner of bio-
logical incidents (whether natural, accidental or de-
liberate in origin) and to build impactful and
sustainable health-security capacity.
The role of Canada
Canada’s Weapons Threat Reduction Program (WTRP),
originally known as the Global Partnership Program
(GPP), is Canada’s contributions to the G7-led Global
Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Mate-
rials of Mass Destruction. Since its establishment in
2002, Canada’s WTRP has delivered nearly $1.4 billion
in concrete programming to address chemical, bio-
logical, radiological and nuclear proliferation and terror-
ism threats. The WTRP was renewed on an ongoing
basis in 2018 with funding of $73.4 million per year.
Canada’s WTRP is a leader in the delivery of biological
threat reduction programming and has supported
dozens of countries over the years to, inter alia,
strengthen biosafety and biosecurity for pathogens of se-
curity concern (e.g. anthrax and Ebola), enhance surveil-
lance and diagnostic capabilities and improve capacities
to prevent, detect and respond to biological threats.
Major initiatives currently underway include projects to
identify, secure and/or destroy vulnerable samples of
Ebola virus in Africa support to the WHO and other
international agencies to develop a new capacity to re-
spond to the deliberate use of disease and the develop-
ment of new solutions to enhance sustainable biosafety
and biosecurity in low resource settings. In the delivery
of global health security programming, Canada’s WTRP
has developed strong ties and collaborative partnerships
with other Government of Canada agencies (e.g. Canad-
ian Food Inspection Agency, Public Health Agency of
Canada and the National Microbiology Laboratory in
Winnipeg), international organisations (e.g. WHO, OIE
and INTERPOL) and other GP partner countries (most
notably the United Kingdom and the United States).
From slogan to reality
In recent years, considerable progress has been made
in acknowledging the importance of multisectoral col-
laboration and partnership to mitigate all manner of
biological threats, regardless their origin. However,
while initiatives such as the Global Health Security
Agenda (GHSA) have elevated the level of attention
and political discourse, more needs to be done to
translate high-level commitments into tangible ac-
tions. Biological threats persist and are ever-evolving,
and no single sector, country, agency or organization
can hope to mitigate them alone. Further work is re-
quired to create a true global health security partner-
ship, where stakeholders from across the spectrum
come together for a common objective: enhanced
capacity and capability to prevent, detect and respond
to all manner of disease. Only through more active,
coordinated and mutually beneficial collaboration will
“global health security” be converted from a slogan to
an actuality.
ACTION: installation of a bio threats scanning group
The Bio Threats Scanning Group comprises top level ex-
perts from 10 leading laboratories: Linfa Wang (Duke-
NUS Medical School, Singapore); George Gao (China
CDC); William B. Karesh (EcoHealth Alliance); Ab Oster-
haus (RIZ Hannover, Germany); John Mackenzie (Curtin
University, Australia); Rebecca Katz (Georgetown Univer-
sity, US); Ron Fouchier (Erasmus MC Rotterdam,
Netherlands); Thomas V. Inglesby (John Hopkins, US);
Geoffrey Smith (Cambridge University, UK); Ian Lipkin
(Columbia University, US). It was established
– to provide an overarching perspective to One Health
and global health security,
– to connect One Health science and Global Health
Security policy,
– to help predict potential biological events that could
impact on public health security in the future
– to actively collaborate on bio threats scanning with
international organizations.
– to take up an Ad Hoc advisory role provided on an
on-call basis at external meetings or to groups (both
scientific and policy)
– to safeguard consistent attention for global health
security throughout the congress programmes
ACTION: connecting one health science and global health
security
There is a significant increase in the emergence of
infectious agents and the risk of new pandemics as
exemplified by the spread of highly pathogenic
H5N1 influenza since 2003, the pandemic H1N1 in-
fluenza in 2009, influenza H7N9 in 2013, SARS,
MERS, chikungunya, dengue, Zika and Ebola. It is
relevant to note that SARS, as the first novel pan-
demic virus of the new millennium, has clearly
demonstrated that:
– previously unknown pathogens can emerge from a
wildlife source at any time in any place and without
warning, threaten the health, well-being and econ-
omies of all societies;
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– there is a clear need for countries to have the
capability and capacity to maintain an effective alert
and response system to detect and quickly react to
outbreaks of international concern, and to share
information about such outbreaks rapidly and
transparently;
– responding to pandemic threats requires global
cooperation and global participation.
Zoonotic diseases have security implications: 80% of
known biological weapons have a zoonotic origin. Yet,
the One Health concept is not limited to zoonoses as it
indeed incorporates all pathogens which have an impact
on Global Health Security, including food and water
security.
The essential need for a multilateral and multi-sectoral
approach to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious
diseases threats is acknowledged by all major inter-
national health organizations, including the World
Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture
Organization, the World Organization for Animal
Health, the World Bank, the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the Global Health
Security Agenda (GHSA). It is also at the core of the
Global Partnership Biological Security Working Group
objectives, as it aims to build global capacity to prevent,
detect, and respond to deliberate disease threats.
The One Health Platform is a Scientific Reference
Network and a Strategic Forum of Stakeholders that
connects One Health Science and One Health Policy to
improve Global Health Security.
In the 2019–2020 period, the One Health Platform
aims to:
– Exchange the latest high-level scientific state-of-the-
art research and gather information on OHS and
AMR at the biennial congresses and disseminate the
results and insights of existing and new research
projects on zoonoses, emerging infectious diseases
and antimicrobial resistance, including the ecological
and environmental factors which drive and impact
on these diseases. In that way, we aim to make sci-
ence evolve, thus improving health and security;
– Identify and prioritize research gaps in the fields of
zoonoses, emerging infectious diseases and
antimicrobial resistance, including the ecological and
environmental factors which impact on these
diseases, and advocate the resulting scientific
research agenda - both at the scientific and the
policy level;
– Engage the broader scientific community and global
health security policy makers in understanding that
some zoonotic and animal diseases can potentially
be misused;
– Work with the Bio Threats Scanning Group of
experts further connecting One Health Science and
Global Health Security Policy;
– Create synergies and facilitate the sharing of data
between researchers and research groups in order to
mend the prioritized research gaps, and translate these
novel data to anyone who might benefit from them;
– Translate the relevant information and knowledge to
governments and policy makers and serve as a
reference network and a resource for providing
information to governments, thus connecting One
Health Science and Global Health Security Policy by
maintaining a web portal and by operating a Customer
Relationship Management (database) system;
– Provide a strategic forum for researchers, early
career investigators, governmental and non-
governmental institutions, international organiza-
tions and companies in the One Health arena to fos-
ter cross-sectoral collaborations.
Reducing antimicrobial resistance
HIGHLIGHT: quantifying the problem of antimicrobial
resistance
Joergen Schlundt, Nanyang Technological University,
Singapore
This highlight presents an overview of antimicrobial
resistance, and a plea for its One Health surveillance and
the use of next generation DNA sequencing as a tool to
respond to it.
Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is a fast-growing
problem caused by a number of complex and interacting
factors involving different sources and transmission
pathways. The lack of data on the relative importance of
these different pathways is hampering global efforts and
optimal interventions to effectively manage the risks. In
particular, little quantitative knowledge exists on the
relative contributions of these sources, which means that
targeting interventions could be sub-optimal.
The origins of AMR
Originally it was suggested that the AMR problem origi-
nated from the use of antimicrobials in humans, but human
use is now known to account for only part of the problem.
Fluoroquinolone was approved for human use in the
US in 1986 and over the next 10 years, no resistance in
human infections was observed. In 1996 it was approved
for use in poultry and resistant infections in humans
were immediately noticed (Fig. 7).
It has also been documented how reduction in use re-
sults in reduction in AMR. The prevalence of nalidixic
acid resistance in Salmonella isolates from chicken in
China and Europe, where no restrictions on its use are
in force, is respectively 67 and 62%. In the US where its
Osterhaus et al. One Health Outlook             (2020) 2:6 Page 20 of 32
use in poultry is banned, resistance is only 1.5%. It
should be noted that basically all human salmonellosis
cases originate in food-producing animals [11].
Evidence for resistance transmission from farm animals
to humans is particularly strong in the case of Campylo-
bacter relative to the use of antimicrobials in poultry. The
difference in resistance to fluoroquinolones in human
Campylobacter infections in countries that have banned
or still allow their use is clearly evident (Fig. 8).
Despite the evidence, discussions are still ongoing. For
example, industry advocates claim that the increase in
fluoroquinolone resistance in human Campylobacter in-
fections in Denmark in recent years (to 35%), despite the
fact that fluoroquinolones are not used in Danish
poultry, indicates that it is human fluoroquinolone use
which is to blame. However, research data shows that
the most likely explanation for the trend is the large in-
crease in poultry imports to Denmark from countries
that use fluoroquinolones in poultry.
Similarly, production of extended-spectrum β-
lactamases (ESBLs) is a significant resistance mechan-
ism that impedes the antimicrobial treatment of infec-
tions caused by Enterobacteriaceae by cephalosporins.
Neither Denmark nor Sweden use cephalosporins, yet
resistant microorganisms in live poultry moving from
the UK (where cephalosporins are used) to Denmark
and Sweden have been identified, resulting in the
introduction of such resistant microorganisms in pro-
duction chains in Denmark and Sweden. This indi-
cates that a problem with AMR in one country is a
problem for all countries, especially with global ex-
ports of food and animals rising.
The impacts of AMR
Widely ranging estimates exist for the importance of the
food animal reservoir of resistant microorganisms for
human health. Industry organizations claim almost zero
deaths, whereas specific research focusing on cephalo-
sporin resistance alone indicates that more than 1500
deaths and over 65,000 days of hospital admissions are
due to the use of cephalosporins in chickens in Europe
alone. The global estimate of deaths from AMR Is pres-
ently 700,000, suggested to rise to 10 million by 2015
[12] (higher than the 7–8 million cancer deaths).
Back in 2003, the 1st Joint FAO/OIE/WHO Expert
Workshop on non-human antimicrobial usage and
resistance concluded that there is clear evidence of
adverse human health consequences caused by resistant
organisms resulting from non-human usage of antimi-
crobials. This includes infections that would not have
otherwise occurred; increased frequency of treatment
failures and deaths; and increased severity of infections
(e.g. fluoroquinolone resistant Salmonella infections).
A Danish study concluded that patients infected with
Salmonella typhimurium resistant to ampicillin, chloram-
phenicol, streptomycin, sulfonamide and tetracycline were
approximately five times more likely to die than the gen-
eral population within the 2 years following infection,
whereas patients infected with quinolone resistant S.
typhimurium were approximately ten times more likely to
die than the general population – patients infected with
fully susceptible S. typhimurium were only two times
more likely to die within 2 years [13].
A comparison of two hospital cohorts (combined from
13 countries) showed that mortality associated with E.
coli infections resistant to 3rd generation cephalosporins
was 2.5 times higher than for patients infected with sus-
ceptible E. coli [14].
Moreover, it is estimated that at least 23,000 deaths
per year in the US and up to 25,000 deaths per year
in Europe could be directly attributable to AMR.
Obviously, this has a huge economic impact too. The
costs attributed to resistant bacterial infections in
humans were in 2009 estimated at €1.5 billion
Fig. 7 Percent fluoroquinolone resistant Infections In humans In USA 1986–2005 (Source: CDC)
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annually in Europe [15], and $20 billion annually (for
healthcare) and $35 billion a year (productivity loss)
in the USA [16]. Some models estimate that AMR
has a cost of more than 0.5% of the global GDP [17];
a figure that is likely to increase significantly in the
coming decades.
Steps to tackle AMR
The Global Action Plan to tackle AMR was endorsed
by the World Health Assembly in May 2015. Its five
objectives are to improve awareness and understand-
ing of AMR; strengthen knowledge through surveil-
lance and research; reduce the incidence of infection;
optimize the use of antimicrobial agents; and ensure
sustainable investment in countering antimicrobial
resistance.
In the absence of a good evidence base it is very diffi-
cult to compare the effectiveness of different initiatives
in different countries [18]. However, important steps
already taken are:
– documenting the use of antimicrobials and the
occurrence of resistance;
– regulating all use of antimicrobials;
– blocking the rights of vets and physicians to make a
profit from selling antimicrobials;
– significantly reducing the unnecessary use of
antimicrobials (starting with a ban on the use of
antimicrobial growth promoters).
In regard to stopping the veterinary profession from
profiting from selling antimicrobials, in 1995 a law
was passed in Denmark that banned the routine
prophylactic usage of antimicrobials in animals, and
which limited the veterinarians’ profit from the direct
sale of drugs. This immediately led to a 40% drop in
therapeutic drug use in the animal sector in Denmark.
Similar bans exist in other Nordic countries. Most likely
strong opposition from the veterinary organizations – and
drug companies – have resulted in that such restrictions
have not been accepted in most other countries.
Global microbial identifier (GMI) (www.globalmicrobialidentifier.
org)
In the future, a global system of DNA genome databases
for microbial (and AMR) identification and diagnostics
could be established, enabling a professional response to
health threats for all countries with basic laboratory in-
frastructure (Fig. 9).
A GMI would enable five major lines of action:
– simple identification of all microorganisms in clinical
(or other) settings;
– enabling reduction of total time (and cost) for
characterization;
– a total database of unique sequences of all relevant
microbiological strains globally – including ‘positive’
microorganisms, e.g. for food production or
environmental remediation;
Fig. 8 Fluoroquinolone resistance in human Campylobacter jejuni infections (ECDC
2014 https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/antimicrobial-consumption/surveillance-and-disease-data/database)
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– enabling real-time global surveillance of human,
animal and plant disease developments;
– and a backbone of microbial DNA sequences to be
used for deep sequencing analyses from different
sources (gut, sewage, environment, food) [19].
Developing countries could enjoy a next generation se-
quencing leap-frog: new diagnostics systems avoid the
need for specialized training and reach further with real-
time characterization of microorganisms in decentralized
labs with sequencers.
A global initiative to create an active database such as
this will promote One Health as it can be applied to
humans, animals, plants, food and the environment as
well as to viruses, bacteria, fungi and parasites.
HIGHLIGHT: the role of diagnostics and vaccines in
reducing antimicrobial use in food producing animals
Jaap A. Wagenaar, Utrecht University, the Netherlands
Vaccination as a measure in infection prevention is gen-
erally considered to contribute to a reduction of anti-
microbial use (AMU). One of the objectives of the World
Health Organization Global Action Plan is to “reduce the
incidence of infection through effective sanitation, hygiene
and infection prevention measures”. In this plan, vaccin-
ation is mentioned as a tool to reduce AMU in humans as
well as in animals (WHO-Global Action Plan). Vaccin-
ation against pathogens is a significant part of farm animal
management. It should be stressed that vaccination is not
a stand-alone measure but should be part of an integral
approach including veterinary oversight, good biosecurity
and husbandry practices, feed quality, climate and the use
of diagnostics (OIE, ad hoc group, 2015). However, no
quantitative data exists on the contribution of vaccination
to the reduction of AMU.
Studies on the association between AMU and vaccin-
ation are scarce. One study explored whether the use of
group medication with antibiotics in a Danish pig herd
would be reduced after vaccination of the pigs against
proliferative enteropathy (PE) caused by Lawsonia intra-
cellularis [20]. In the vaccinated batches, the consump-
tion of oxytetracycline to treat PE was reduced by 79%,
with a significantly lower number of pigs being treated
(P < 0.0001). Vaccination thus resulted in a highly sig-
nificant reduction in antimicrobial use.
One Danish study showed a positive association between
the use of vaccines against Circovirus and Mycoplasma and
the amount of antimicrobials prescribed in weaning pigs.
The same group retrieved data from Vetstat and stud-
ied the change in amounts of antimicrobials prescribed
for weaners and finishers in herds following initiation of
vaccination against five common endemic infections:
Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae, Actinobacillus pleuropneu-
moniae, porcine circovirus type II, porcine reproductive
and respiratory syndrome virus, and Lawsonia intracel-
lularis [21]. This study provided little support for the hy-
pothesis that vaccination against five common endemic
diseases provides a plausible general strategy to reduce
antimicrobial use in Danish pig herds.
A cross-sectional study in 227 farrow-to-finish pig
herds in Belgium, France, Germany and Sweden between
December 2012 and December 2013 [22] showed that
herds vaccinated against more pathogens showed a
higher treatment incidence.
Fig. 9 In the future, a global system of DNA genome databases for microbial (and AMR) identification and diagnostics could be established,
enabling a professional response to health threats for all countries with basic laboratory infrastructure
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Summing up the scientific evidence, there seems to be
a correlation between the use of vaccines and the higher
use of antimicrobials. This is most probably the result of
a response to disease problems.
Field observations
A country-wide intervention study was conducted in
AMU in the Netherlands. Total sales in therapeutically
used antimicrobials decreased by nearly 64% over the
years 2009–2017 (Fig. 10).
The decline in sales of antimicrobials was followed by
a significant reduction in antimicrobial resistance as
measured in commensal Escherichia coli in animals in
slaughterhouse (NRL antimicrobial resistance, Lelystad,
the Netherlands) [23] (Fig. 11).
Parallel to the decrease of AMU, data of vaccine sales
from FIDIN, the federation of the Dutch veterinary
pharmaceutical industry (2009–2017) showed an in-
creasing use of vaccines in pigs (+ 100%), poultry (+
25%), cattle (+ 100%) and goats (+ 6%).
It is interesting to note that, when farmers and veteri-
narians are asked about measures taken to reduce the
use of antimicrobials, vaccination is often not considered
to be an important measure. In broiler production the
shift to slower growing breeds has led to a huge reduc-
tion in the use of antimicrobials in broilers. In the dairy
industry, the introduction of a guideline for the selective
drying of dairy cows instead of blanket therapy resulted
in a considerable reduction in the use of antimicrobials.
The reduction in AMU was 39% for dry cow therapy
and of 38% for clinical mastitis cases.
Diagnostics
Diagnostics are an important tool in antimicrobial stew-
ardship. Bacteriological analysis including antimicrobial
susceptibility testing provides guidance for the choice of
antimicrobial that can be used. In both the Netherlands
and Denmark, a system is in place in which some antimi-
crobials are restricted to human use and only used in ani-
mals in exceptional cases. These are defined by the WHO
as the highest prioritized Critically Important Antimicro-
bials for Human Medicine (CIA) and include 3rd and 4th
generation cephalosporines and fluoroquinolones. These
can only be used for animals when a susceptibility test has
been conducted that demonstrates that there is no alter-
native first or second choice antimicrobial. This policy has
led to hardly any 3rd and 4th generation cephalosporines
and fluoroquinolones use in these countries.
Conclusions
Hardly any evidence-based data exists on AMU reduc-
tion by vaccination in animal production. Field studies
are difficult to perform as they are influenced by so
many factors. However, it is extremely important to
stress that vaccination is just one element of an infection
control program that should be guided and tailor-made
Fig. 10 Total sales of antimicrobials for use in animals in the Netherlands (source: FIDIN)
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by a professional (veterinarian). A professional who can
oversee the different aspects is needed to give advice on
the use of vaccines.
HIGHLIGHT: reduced and responsible use of antibiotics in
food-producing animals in The Netherlands
Christianne J.M. Bruschke, Frouke de Groot, Ministry of
Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality, The Netherlands
This highlight provides an overview of past, present
and future measures implemented in the Netherlands to
reduce the usage of antibiotics and the levels of anti-
microbial resistance.
The Netherlands is a densely populated country of
34,000 km2 and 17 million people. Next to the high
number of people there are 4 million cattle, 12
million swine, 325,000 horses, 1.5 million sheep and
goats, and 100 million poultry. Within a 10 km radius
of some areas of the country up to 1000 commercial
cattle and pig farms, or 400 poultry farms can be
found. The high usage of antibiotics in the veterinary
sector in the beginning of this century was related to
a strong risk of emerging drug resistance. Conse-
quently, there was a clear need for a reduced and re-
sponsible use of antibiotics in food-producing animals
in the Netherlands. The main goal of the antibiotic
reduction program was to prevent the development
and spread of antimicrobial resistance and to increase
overall animal health in the country.
Since 2009, the antibiotic reduction policy has been
structured around a number of key elements. Self-
Fig. 11 Antimicrobials resistance in commensal E. coli in animals (rectal swabs in slaughterhouse). Percentage of resistance for different
antimicrobials in different animals
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regulation has been combined with public surveillance
and enforcement. Transparency involves the mandatory
registration of the use of all antibiotics in central data-
bases. Benchmarking has been performed by the inde-
pendent Veterinary Medicines Authority (SDa) of the
Netherlands. Mandatory health and treatment plans
have been instigated at farm level, involving one-to-one
relationships between farmers and vets. Veterinary
guidelines have been communicated, and private quality
schemes developed. Reduction targets have been set,
such as reducing antibiotic use by 20% by 2011; 50% by
2013; and 70% by 2015 compared to the reference
amount of substances sold in 2009.
As a result, antimicrobial sales have significantly de-
creased over the last 10 years (Fig. 12).
By 2016 the use of antimicrobials had been reduced by
64%. In 2017 this level was slightly less, at 63.4%, The
difference was explained by SDa as stockpiling and use
in non-monitored sectors.
However, as can be seen from the graph, the reduction
in the use of antibiotics levelled off in the past 5 years.
The current policy was clearly no longer effective to fur-
ther reduce antibiotic usage. As further reductions were
still desirable to continue to reduce antimicrobial resist-
ance, a new policy was necessary.
Key elements of reduction policy 2.0
Sector specific reduction actions along with research on
the critical success factors that are correlated with the
use of antibiotics will be used to further reduce the
usage of antibiotics. However, a key question is “what
are the critical success factors?”
Regarding the research being conducted into these
critical success factors, it is useful to consider some of
the methods employed. Data was collected on the use of
antibiotics – whether low or high – on farms. Sectors
covered were veal calf, pig and poultry. Statistical ana-
lyses were performed on possible associations between
farm characteristics such as farm type, farm size, farm
management, and animal health.
So-called ‘statistical associations’ refer to a certain
factor related to the level of antibiotic use (this is
not a cause-and-effect relationship). It may be that a
‘small size farm’ has an association with ‘low use’;
this means that a smaller business in this sector may
be a success factor to have. Note that the ‘why’
question has not been answered yet and must follow
from further in-depth research, for example into
behaviour.
The results of the critical success factors research
are associations which are not necessarily causal rela-
tions. In all sectors, clear leads have been identified
to decrease the usage. Further analysis on the associa-
tions is needed to define possible causalities. This has
already started, focusing on social factors at farms
with low usage. This will hopefully lead to the devel-
opment of tools that could be implemented at farms
with high usage.
Specific results from the veal calf sector indicate
that small farms often have a lower usage of antibi-
otics, and that usage depends on management fac-
tors. Higher usage is associated with a lower number
of staff; more calf nationalities present on the farm;
calves from only Dutch origins; a higher number of
bull calves; lower start weight; season (autumn and
winter); and Salmonella infections. Also linked with
management is that less antibiotics are used with a
high number of Full Time Equivalents (FTEs) per
calf, but other factors probably also play a role, such
as education, personality type of farmer, etc.
Fig. 12 The Netherlands Veterinary Medicines Institute (SDa): Developments in sales of antibiotics between 1999 and 2018, in number of
kilograms of active substances sold (× 1,000) (source: FIDIN), by main pharmacotherapeutic group
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Still in the veal calf sector, antibiotic usage also de-
pends on social factors. Higher usage is associated with
less trust in veterinarians; an increased role of a feeding
specialist; a lower perception of the health of calves; and
a decrease in social pressure. Other, unexplained factors
affect higher usage, such as buildings staying empty for
longer and physically being separated.
Looking at the pig sector, small farms often have a
lower usage of antibiotics, and usage depends on a range
of management factors. Fewer vaccinations give lower
usage levels. For sows, higher usage occurs when fatten-
ing pigs stay on the farm. For fattening pigs, lower usage
is seen when the animals are coming from closed farms.
More piglets per sow increases the usage.
Turning to the poultry sector, it’s clear that large
farms often have a lower usage of antimicrobials. Slower
growing breeds use less antibiotics, while thinning the
flocks seems to increase the usage.
Conclusions
The current reduction of antibiotic use remains at nearly
64%. This is still less than the target of 70% reduction
from 2009 levels. Sector specific reduction targets should
lead to this 70% reduction. Especially in the veal calf sec-
tor, useful outcomes have been identified to lower the
usage. Implementation of critical success factors will
help to reach the targets.
Further analysis on the associations is needed to define
possible causalities. This has already started by focusing
on social factors at farms with low usage. This will hope-
fully provide tools that can be implemented at farms
with high usage.
ACTION: establishment of a new scientific agenda on
AMR at the 6th world one health congress
Antimicrobial resistance has emerged as a health issue
in the last decades, but only in the last couple of years
has there been an understanding that we are facing a
post-antibiotic era, in which common infections and
minor injuries, which have been treatable for decades,
can once again kill.
Misuse and overuse of antibiotics in both humans and
agriculture are the basis of the emergence of AMR. Whilst
raising awareness of AMR is an important issue, new anti-
biotics need to be developed. World experts should elab-
orate on the use of antibiotics and the surge of AMR in
food animals and humans and scan the horizon for new
antibiotics and antivirals in a true One Health spirit.
The One Health Platform brings this issue to the fore-
front by installing a double AMR track at its World One
Health Congress to increase public awareness for AMR
(Table 1).
Let’s talk science
PETER DOHERTY, Professor of Microbiology and Im-
munology at the University of Melbourne2
Communication
The One Health approach has always been a part of hu-
man civilisation. The rise of agriculture (about 10,000
years ago) saw the progressive move from the hunter/
gatherer lifestyle to stable communities in villages and
towns, while biblical dietary restrictions reflected an
awareness of food-borne diseases. Modern experiments
on bovines led to the vaccinations we have today. Ad-
dressing the connections between human and animal
health and the environment, the One Health Approach
recognises their interrelatedness and its inherent com-
plexity. A multidisciplinary, collaborative and integrated
approach to zoonoses research, policy and management
needs to be developed.
Such an approach presents an unprecedented complex
global challenge for collaboration among a wide range of
stakeholders, for whom knowledge and experience is
vital. The One Health Congress is an opportunity to
promote a ‘paradigm of connectedness’ and bring stake-
holders, scientists and interested parties together, but it
is not the only way to reach them. Sustained and tar-
geted communication of the science involved, by scien-
tists for the public, is one of the most effective ways to
spread the scientific and One Health messages. Only by
doing so and educating people, can the fear and misin-
formation that often distorts scientific messages be
addressed.
The success of one health
Amongst other biomedical discoveries, advances in re-
search in immunology, virology, epidemiology and re-
lated fields have enabled researchers to take great strides
in fighting infectious diseases. By recognizing the possi-
bilities inherent in interconnectedness of infectious dis-
eases on the one hand and comparative medicine on the
other, practices have been developed that have led to nu-
merous medical breakthroughs. Scientists identified, for
example, humoral immunity as the basis of vaccines and
allowed us to eradicate two pathogens after world-wide
vaccination programmes – smallpox in humans in 1980
and rinderpest in cattle in 2011. The smallpox vaccine
was created with a production system that entailed scari-
fication of the virus into calves and then administered to
humans, a process similar to that employed by the first
immunologists in the eighteenth century. The eradica-
tion of rinderpest was a much more targeted campaign
2Laureate of the 1996 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine (with Rolf
M. Zinkernagel), Prof. Doherty is the first veterinarian to be so
recognized.
Osterhaus et al. One Health Outlook             (2020) 2:6 Page 27 of 32
using many more epidemiological principles, which re-
sulted in a real triumph for international agencies and
international cooperation.
Implicit in the One Health agenda is that challenges
like pandemics are global and do not respect inter-
national boundaries. Inclusion of the One Health
Principles within public health agencies as well as the
continued cooperation between international agencies
and governments have been very important in advan-
cing the One Health project and have been key to its
success.
A growing awareness of the interconnectedness be-
tween human health and the environment is also evi-
dent within the medical sciences and academia in
general. The medical journal Lancet has instituted a
20-year programme where they will report every 2
years on the interface between climate change and
human health. They will take a broad approach and
include issues such as food and water availability,
quality of water, social disruptions as well as focusing
on the spread away from the equator of insect-born
infections. By taking a One Health Approach, the
journal provides a platform for scientists to engage
with new fields and research.
One of the most successful ways that science has been
communicated recently to the public has been through
the online forum, ‘The Conversation’. This forum is a
not-for-profit media outlet that uses content sourced
from academics and researchers. Any person associated
with an academic or research institution can write for
the platform on any scientific, economic or cultural
topic. A rigorous but amiable editorial process is
followed in collaboration with experienced journalists, to
ensure the production of quality articles accessible to
the public. Furthermore, a conflict of interest statement
is provided along with the name and association of the
author, to ensure full transparency. All articles can be
Table 1 Double AMR track proposed for the World One Health
Congress in 2020
1. Burden and Impact of AMR
- AMR and global burden of disease
- Global health security
- Impact of AMR on animal production and food safety
- Impact of AMR on global trade
- Societal impacts from AMR
- Economic impact
2. Transmission human, animal, environment
- What has been achieved, what is the evidence?
- Systems epidemiology of transmission
- Biosafety
- Farm to fork to man and back?
- Waste management and impact on AMR transmission
3. Surveillance of AMR
- Human (hospital, community), animal, environment
- Use of whole genome sequencing for surveillance, one health
microbiology, Global Microbial Identifier
- Evolution of AMR
- Gene mobilization factors (including waste management)
- Integrated AMR and antimicrobial use surveillance
- Big data
4. Use of antibiotics
- AMR and use of antibiotics for growth promotion
- Role of antibiotics (including food safety)
- Antimicrobial treatment of emerging MDROs
- Antimicrobial stewardship
- Infection prevention and control
- Access to antimicrobial medicines
- Quality of antibiotics
5. Policy interventions
- Global policy interventions, IACG
- National Action Plans
- National/regional experience in reducing antimicrobial use:
Efficiency and Effect
- AMR and SDGs
- Regulatory interventions
- Use of Big Data to guide interventions
- Trade policy (impact on global trade)
- Quality measures of antibiotics
6. New economic models
- Push/pull incentives for antibiotic drug and diagnostic
development
- Public private partnerships
- Drug/Diagnostic partnerships
- Economic impact assessment and modelling
- Economic benefits
- New models of trade
7. Behaviour Change and Social Sciences
- Antimicrobial stewardship
- Public perception and education in all One Health sectors
- Socioeconomic barriers and cultural differences




- Training the next generation
- Building surveillance infrastructure
- Implementation National Action Plans
- One health approaches to teaching and training curricula
9. Diagnostics and detection
- Rapid, point of care, pen side diagnostics
- Outbreak detection
- Biomarkers of infection
- Food safety and monitoring
Table 1 Double AMR track proposed for the World One Health
Congress in 2020 (Continued)
- Diagnostic stewardship
10. Antibiotic drug development and manufacturing
- Design and implementation of efficient clinical trials
for novel antibiotics
- Development of new antimicrobials
- Addressing bacterial cell wall permeability
- Manufacturing in LMICS
- Waste/waste water treatment
11. Alternative approaches to tackling resistant infections
- Vaccines (against bacteria, viruses, etc)
- Antibiotic alternatives (e.g. bacteriophages, immune
modulators)
- Non-traditional approaches for humans and animals
- Genome editing
- Animal models of disease
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shared free of charge by other media outlets, provided
that they do not modify the content. The ‘Conversation’
has a monthly online audience of 10.7 million users
onsite globally, and a reach of 35 million people through
republication.
Challenges to one health
Communicating the values of vaccines, especially to
people in advanced countries who have not seen the
infections that plague many places in the developing
world, is another challenge facing scientists and policy
makers. Making scientific information available across
traditional media such as newspapers remains a strug-
gle and misinformation around scientific data persists.
In fact, the problem is growing. There are regular
measles outbreaks in Western countries as parents re-
fuse to vaccinate their children. The problem is that
some parents, holistic healers and even doctors and
legislators, do not accept the value of vaccination.
The information available about vaccination is often
contradictory as some sources are neither legitimate
nor transparent, leading to a suspicion and mistrust
of the science and scientists.
The main pandemic threat to humanity is influenza,
which has not sufficiently been acknowledged for the
danger it poses despite the efforts of scientists. It is
well-documented that new pathogens are emerging
from nature constantly, but there is not yet consensus
whether anti-viral small molecules (drugs) against all
virus classes that are potential threats should be made
and tested. What is agreed is that we need better and
more rapidly produced vaccines, and a clearer under-
standing of pathogenesis for evidence-based therapy.
This is also the case for HIV/AIDS and the hepatitis
C virus, which have no vaccines yet, though there is
a drug cure for HCV.
A threat to the creation of One Health policies and
the global One Health agenda is a changing political
landscape. Political movements that promote parochial-
ism and xenophobia are on the rise and present a real
obstacle in implementing international policies, while ig-
noring the scale of the problem. The mix of populism
and neoliberal libertarian philosophies that are against
all taxation and regulation could erode our capacity to
respond effectively to global infectious disease chal-
lenges. Diminished funding for international agencies
and monitoring systems, which compromise both major
diagnostic laboratories and public health services, can
only raise the global risk level.
Furthermore, increased limitation on research with
dangerous pathogens, accompanied by fear mongering
has significantly slowed research. There has been grow-
ing opposition to this within the scientific community,
as the roll out of science-based strategies that could
diminish threat levels has been delayed. It has also pre-
vented research into GM technology that could correct
micro-nutrient deficiency. This type of research holds
numerous possibilities in terms of human health and
well-being but is being thwarted by uninformed, or mis-
informed, attitudes.
Humanity is becoming much more conscious that it is
on a warming planet and there are substantial changes
in weather patterns. Droughts, as a consequence of cli-
mate change, are adversely affecting biomes. This in-
creasingly contributes to the spread of infections,
contrary to the assumption that insect-borne infections
are correlated to high rainfall. In the case of the West
Nile flavivirus outbreak in the US in 2012, a drought
promoted the spread of infection as it brought wild birds
(the hosts of the virus) to limited water sources where
they spread disease to mosquitos, who in turn infected
humans.
Recommendations
The need for substantial change is obvious. The way hu-
manity is generating and using energy should be recon-
sidered, as should the use of plastics, the question of
waste disposal and of chemicals into the environment.
Strategies to manage the global carbon challenge should
be developed so that society can transition to an equit-
able green economy. These are issues that have to be ad-
dressed in a connected and in a global partnership way.
To ensure long-term sustainable solutions to these chal-
lenges, political will and commitment is essential. This
does not only mean developing and implementing the
correct policies locally and internationally, but also en-
suring that the resources are regulated and available for
international bodies to continue their work.
A new social contract between science and society is
the only way forward. To achieve this, communication
of scientific discoveries and practices should improve
drastically. Those working in the sciences need to think
in terms of how they communicate what they do and
why it is important. They should provide an understand-
ing to people of what the issues actually are. The com-
munication around vaccinations should also be
intensified. They way to do so is not to speak about the
vaccine itself, but to speak about what the virus actually
does and how it does it. If the public understood the
consequences of not being vaccinated, it would contrib-
ute to an informed dialogue about the potential benefits
of science to human health.
To communicate their science efficiently and clearly,
researchers should be trained in translating their
findings into information that is easily accessible to the
public. Science can be difficult and complicated for non-
scientists, especially topics such as immunity and
infections. One of the best ways to make scientific
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information available is by using visual representation or
visual elements, like infographics, videos or illustrations.
This is a medium that can be easily understood and dis-
seminated, as has been proven by the success of ‘The
Conversation’. Scientists that have the capacity them-
selves or have the resources to employ someone to
translate the science into a visual language, should en-
deavour to share the information in the public sphere.
The way people are accessing information is changing
and scientists and science communicators should re-
spond to that.
ACTION: VAXVOX
To address the challenge of communicating the value of
vaccinations in general, VAXVOX – science talks was in-
stalled within the One Health Platform (Fig. 13). The aim
of VAXVOX will be to serve as a point of reference on the
scientific aspects of the benefits of vaccination. VAXVOX
will communicate pro-actively and will serve as a point of
contact for the outside world on issues related to vaccin-
ation. In spreading scientific core messages,
Scientists have the moral obligation to “talk back”.
Communication is crucial, sharing and explaining scien-
tific insights are of critical importance. VAXVOX, thus
meets the urgent need for a scientific organization that
serves as a credible reference point on vaccines-related
issues. By spreading scientific core messages, VAXVOX
intends to raise a solid, united voice in the debate about
vaccination.
Conclusions: let’s continue the work
Many One Health issues and challenges were discussed
during the 5th International One Health Conference in
Canada. This document focused on some of the high-
lights. Again, it was clearly demonstrated that the ma-
jority of many new pathogens are zoonoses and an
understanding of the interplay of factors at the inter-
face between humans and animals is absolutely
crucial for their detection, response and control. And
this is exactly what One Health is about: an inte-
grated, holistic approach. Indeed, the role of the
wildlife-domestic animals-human-ecosystem interfaces
has been fundamental to the development of the One
Health paradigm.
Our important principles, taken from the Manhattan
Principles on “One World, One Health” (2004) describe
the fundamentals of One Health.
– To recognize the link between human, domestic
animal, and wildlife health, and the threat disease
poses to people, their food supplies and economies,
and the biodiversity essential to maintaining the
healthy environments and functioning ecosystems
we all require
– To recognize that decisions regarding land and
water use have real implications for health.
Alterations in the resilience of ecosystems and shifts
in patterns of disease emergence and spread
manifest themselves when we fail to recognize this
relationship
– To include wildlife health science as an essential
component of global disease prevention,
surveillance, monitoring, control, and mitigation.
– To devise adaptive, holistic, and forward-looking ap-
proaches to the prevention, surveillance, monitoring,
control, and mitigation of emerging and resurging
diseases that fully account for the complex intercon-
nections among species
To achieve the goals of One Health, we will need to
break down the silos between human health and
veterinary medicine and to ensure effective stakeholder
engagement. In other words, we need to enhance collabor-
ation and cooperation between all parties through the de-
velopment of an integrated approach to human, animal
and ecosystem health. We have made some progress since
the Manhattan Principles. The World Bank, the European
Union, ASEAN, and other multi-national organizations
have assisted in the successful development of regional
One Health networks and national and regional activities.
On a national level, we see an increasing number of excel-
lent One Health activities, notably in South-East Asian
countries like Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Mongolia and
Bhutan, as well as in African countries.
Connections between One Health Science and Global
Health Security are being established and thus there is
more attention for One Health Science with an impact
on Global Health Security in governments and inter-
national institutions. That leads subsequently to in-
creased inter-sectoral collaboration.
The One Health Platform stresses the need for basic,
advanced and continued alertness and education in the
area of biosecurity. International collaboration, educa-
tion and coordination, using all available technology
(classic and novel) are of key importance for future con-
trol of outbreaks.
Fig. 13 The logo of VAXVOX – Science Talks
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In its conferences, the OHP will continue to focus on
– Highlighting contributions related to biosecurity
– Education of young scientists worldwide (fellowships
for conferences)
– Special sessions and lectures about OH related
biosecurity
The One Health Platform stays committed to exchan-
ging the latest high-level scientific state-of-the-art re-
search and gather information on OHS and AMR at the
biennial congresses and disseminate the results and in-
sights of existing and new research projects on zoonoses,
emerging infectious diseases and antimicrobial resist-
ance, including the ecological and environmental factors
which drive and impact on these diseases. In that way,
we aim to make science evolve, thus improving health
and security. There is a clear need for the identification
and prioritization of research gaps in the fields of zoo-
noses, emerging infectious diseases and antimicrobial re-
sistance, including the ecological and environmental
factors which impact on these diseases, and advocate the
resulting scientific research agenda - both at the scien-
tific and the policy level. We need to create synergies
and facilitate the sharing of data between researchers
and research groups in order to mend the prioritized re-
search gaps and translate these novel data to anyone
who might benefit from them.
The One Health Platform is committed to keep on be-
ing a strategic forum for researchers, early career investi-
gators, governmental and non-governmental institutions,
international organizations and companies in the One
Health arena to foster cross-sectoral collaborations.
We stand for collaborative, multisectoral and trans-
boundary approaches that tear down silos and enable
interdisciplinary and multisectoral solutions to tackle
major global health security challenges.
A One Health approach, focusing on emergent infec-
tious diseases, which looks at health in the context of
human, animal and environment relationships is the
only and necessary approach in our interconnected and
fast-paced world.
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